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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
James Timothy Haas appeals from the district court's denial of his third
petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A jury found Haas guilty of sexual battery of a minor child. (R., pp. 70-72.)
The district court sentenced Haas to a unified 25-year sentence with nine years
fixed. (R., p. 71.) Haas filed an Inmate Request form expressing his desire to
appeal, and requesting assistance to do so.

(R., p. 107.) Although this was

forwarded to the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, no appeal was filed.
(R., p. 108.) Thereafter, Haas filed a Rule 35 motion, and later a (first) petition

for post-conviction relief; the same counsel was appointed to represent Haas in
both matters. (R., p. 108.)
The parties filed a stipulation in settlement of post-conviction relief, which
included an agreement that Haas' Rule 35 motion would be determined on its
merits following a hearing.

(R., p. 108.)

Based on the stipulation, the district

court entered a conditional order dismissing Haas' post-conviction matter. 1 (R.,
p. 108.)

Following the hearing on Haas' Rule 35 motion, the district court

amended Haas' sentence to a unified term of 25 years with seven years fixed.
(R., p. 109.)

1

The conditional order indicated that a final order dismissing Haas' first petition
would be entered upon entry of the court's decision on Haas' Rule 35 motion.
(R., pp. 108-09.) However, no final order was filed. (R., p. 109.)

1

Haas filed a second petition for post-conviction relief seven years later,
asserting two claims:

(1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because no appeal was filed on his behalf despite his timely request; and (2) that
he was entitled to relief under two Idaho Supreme Court cases decided since his
first post-conviction petition. (R., pp. 107, 113.) Counsel from Haas' first petition
and Rule 35 motion was reappointed to represent him. (R., p. 109.) The district
court conducted an evidentiary hearing and accepted additional briefing. (R., p.
110.) Thereafter, the district court entered a memorandum decision and order
dismissing the petition. (R., pp. 107-19.)
In its order of dismissal, the district court addressed I. C. § 19-4908, which
bars successive petitions absent a sufficient reason for adequately asserting
claims in the original petition. (R., pp. 113, 119.) The district court found that
Haas failed to demonstrate why his claims were inadequately raised in his first
petition.

(R., p. 119.)

Noting that Haas stipulated to dismiss his first post-

conviction petition, the district court also seemed to find that Haas waived his
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal, to the extent such claim
was raised therein. (R., pp.114-16.) In addition, the district court found that the
cases relied on by Haas in his second post-conviction petition, which were
decided after Haas was sentenced, did not apply retroactively or were otherwise
inapplicable. (R., pp.117-119.) Haas did not appeal.
Fifteen months later, Haas filed his third petition for post-conviction relief
pro se. (R., pp. 4-14.) The petition asserted ineffective assistance of counsel
claims concerning counsel's performances at trial, in failing to appeal, and in
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relation to Haas' Rule 35 motion and initial post-conviction petition. (R., p. 5.)
The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss the petition as untimely, and
gave Haas 40 days to respond. (R., pp. 64-68.) Haas responded, arguing that
there is no time limitation for successive petitions, and that his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims must be heard on their merits under Martinez v.
Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). (R., pp. 74-76.) The state replied, asserting the
petition should be dismissed as barred under I.C. § 19-4908, and as res judicata.
(R., pp. 77-78.)

In a sur-reply, Haas again cited Martinez and attacked the

state's reply as inadequate. (R., pp. 92-94.)
The district court entered an order dismissing Haas' third petition because
Haas failed to provide a sufficient reason justifying a successive petition under
I.C. § 19-4908, and entered a separate judgment. (R., pp. 97-101, 126.) Haas
timely appealed. (R., pp. 121-26.)
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ISSUES
Haas states the issues on appeal as:
(1)

The appellant was denied effective counsel at trial, appeals
and post-conviction under US Supreme Court Martinez v
Ryan 6th Amendment Claims

(2)

Did counsel forgo post-conviction to reduce sentence which
was not reduced knowing the commission would not release
Appellant upon completion of his fix sentence? 5th and 6th
Amendment claims.

(3)

Trial counsel failed to file a timely appeal when instructed to
and court records show's petitioner informed his counsel to
file a timely appeal

(4)

Trial counsel was told by petitioner to take plea agreement
and failed to take it, saying "We'll win this case?" And
counsel guaranteed he'd win to "sit down and shut up." 6th
Amend.

(5)

Court went beyond recommended sentence by prosecutor
and the court gave appellant a very harsh sentence given
the victim was almost 18 years old, which is cruel and
unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment.

(Appellant's brief, p. 2 (verbatim).)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Haas failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing
Haas' third petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Haas Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing
Haas' Third Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Haas' third petition for post-conviction relief claimed ineffective assistance

by trial counsel, for (1) proceeding to trial rather than pursuing a plea agreement,
and (2) failing to appeal after trial.

(R., p. 5.)

Haas also claimed ineffective

assistance by counsel for his Rule 35 motion and first post-conviction petition for
settling his first post-conviction petition case without achieving a further reduction
in his sentence.

(R., p. 5.)

The district court dismissed Haas' petition,

concluding that Haas failed to explain "why his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel were inadequately raised in either of his earlier petitions." (R., p. 100.)
Haas does not address the district court's basis for its dismissal. Instead, Haas
argues the substance of his third petition's underlying claims and adds an
additional claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2, 7-12; see R., p. 5.)
Haas has failed to challenge the basis for the district court's dismissal, to
show that consideration of his new claim is warranted, or to justify his 15-month
delay in filing his third petition. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district
court's order summarily dismissing the petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
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(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).
"Where the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the
trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing."
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2008) (citations
omitted).

C.

Haas Failed To Demonstrate Sufficient Reason Why He Did Not Assert
Or Inadequately Raised His Third Petition's Claims In Prior Petitions
The district court dismissed Haas' third petition as an improper successive

petition because Haas failed to provide sufficient reason for failing to assert his
claims previously. (R., pp. 97-101.) All grounds for relief must be raised in a
petitioner's "original, supplemental or amended application."

I.C. § 19-4908.

"Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived ... may not be the basis for a subsequent application" unless
the district court finds sufficient reason why the claim "was not asserted or was
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." I.C.
§ 19-4908. Haas was on notice of this ground for dismissal in the state's reply.

(R., p. 78.) However, Haas did not address I.C. § 19-4908, either in his sur-reply
to the district court, or in his brief on this appeal. (R., pp. 92-94; see generally
Appellant's brief.)
The record does not support that Haas had a sufficient reason for not
asserting - or inadequately raising - his third post-conviction petition's claims in
his prior petitions.

The record shows Haas raised, or attempted to raise, his

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal, in his first and second
petitions for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 113-16.) In its order dismissing Haas'
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second petition, the district court found that Haas had settled the claim (raised in
his initial petition) "in exchange for certain conditions associated with [his] I.C.R.
35 motion,

which the court agreed to dismiss.

(R., p. 116.)

Haas did not

challenge the district court's determination that counsel's failure to appeal his
underlying criminal matter "was settled."

(R., pp. 108-09, 116.)

Upon re-

asserting the issue in his third petition, Haas offered no explanation why it was
inadequately raised before. (See R., pp. 74-76, 92-94.)
It does not appear from the record that Haas' prior post-conviction
petitions included claims of ineffective assistance by trial counsel for not
pursuing a plea agreement, or ineffective assistance by post-conviction counsel
for settling his initial post-conviction petition. (See R., pp. 107-10.) Haas asserts
no reason why he failed to raise those claims - adequately or not - in his prior
petitions.

(See Appellant's brief.)

Despite that the district court based its

dismissal of Haas' successive petition on I.C § 19-4908, Haas did not address
the provision at all. Rather, Haas argued that dismissal would be improper under
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). (R., pp. 74-76, 92-94.)
On appeal, Haas again fails to address I.C. § 19-4908. Instead, he again
cites Martinez.

(See Appellant's brief, pp. 3-7.) Haas' reliance on Martinez is

misplaced. The Court in Martinez held that a federal habeas court may excuse
the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim where
post-conviction counsel was ineffective in pursuing the claim in state postconviction proceedings.

kl

at 1320. Haas' matter is not now before a federal

habeas court, thus Martinez does not apply. Also, and significantly, Haas did not
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allege specific facts or arguments that he received ineffective assistance by
counsel for his second petition. (R., pp. 75-76, 92-94.)
In Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999), the
Court held that under I. C. § 19-4908, a claim of ineffective assistance by postconviction counsel, "if true, provides sufficient reason for permitting newly
asserted allegations" as well as claims inadequately raised in the prior postconviction petition.

kl

at 798, 992 P.2d at 793 (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102

Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981 )).

Hernandez identified specific facts that his

post-conviction counsel knew and should have raised, but did not, and which he
claimed resulted in the summary dismissal of his prior petition. Hernandez, 133
Idaho at 798-99, 992 P.2d at 793-94. In other words, Hernandez "alleged facts
which, if proven, would constitute sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for the
allowance of a successive application."

kl

at 799, 992 P.2d at 794. Haas did

not. (R., pp. 74-76, 92-94.)
Haas argued he received ineffective assistance by trial counsel for
proceeding to trial and not pursuing a plea agreement, then not pursuing an
appeal. (R, pp. 75, 93.)

Haas also argued he received ineffective assistance by

counsel for his Rule 35 motion by failing to get the indeterminate part of his
sentence reduced, thus foregoing his first petition. (R., pp. 75, 93.). However,
Haas did not argue or allege facts to support a claim that he received ineffective
assistance by counsel for his second post-conviction petition. Accordingly, Haas
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a sufficient reason to avoid dismissal
under I.C. § 19-4908.
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D.

Haas Failed To Preserve A Claim That His Sentence Was Excessive
With respect to Haas' contention on appeal that the district court imposed

an excessive sentence, this claim was never raised to the district court, and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 2, 11.)

Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 58, 106 P.3d 376, 384 (2005). Moreover, such a
claim is not the proper subject of a post-conviction petition, but is a claim that
must be raised on direct appeal.

I.C. § 19-4901 (b).

Although the state

recognizes that Haas has asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
file an appeal, only that claim may be properly adjudicated in post-conviction, not
the substantive claim Haas would have raised on appeal if an appeal had been
filed.

E.

Even If Haas Could Overcome The Successive Petition Bar In I.C. § 194908, His Second Successive Petition Is Untimely
Even if Haas had asserted a sufficient reason to overcome the bar to

successive petitions under I.C. § 19-4908, his petition should nevertheless be
deemed untimely under the circumstances. 2

The Idaho Supreme Court

discussed a "reasonable time standard" for a successive petition under I. C. § 194908, in Charboneau, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870.

In that case, the Court

Although the district court ultimately dismissed Haas' third post-conviction
petition for failure to allege sufficient grounds for relief, it had initially provided
notice of intent to dismiss the petition as untimely. (R., pp. 64-68.) Thus, Haas
had notice and an opportunity to respond and establish why his petition should
be deemed timely; Haas' only response was that there is no time limit for filing
successive petitions (R., pp. 74-76), an argument that ignores I.C. § 19-4908,
and is therefore contrary to law.
2

9

held, "there should be a reasonable time within which [claims based on newly
discovered evidence] are asserted in a successive post-conviction petition, once
those claims are known."

.!.ft

at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. "In determining what a

reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, we will simply consider it on a
case-by-case basis."

.!.ft

The Charboneau Court found that the delay of 13

months after Charboneau's awareness of new evidence, and before filing his
successive petition, was "simply too long a period of time to be reasonable."

.!.ft

The Court of Appeals addressed the reasonableness of a year-long delay
in filing a successive petition, in Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400
(Ct. App. 2008). In that case, the Court agreed with the holding in Charboneau
that, determining the reasonable time for filing a successive petition is
considered "on a case-by-case basis."

.!.ft at

190, 177 P.3d at 404. In Schwartz,

the Court found that the almost-12 months that Schwartz waited after being
denied an extension to file a post-conviction petition, until she filed her petition
alleging ineffective assistance, was too long .

.!.ft at

191, 177 P.3d at 403.

Haas' second petition was dismissed on April 18, 2011, following
evidentiary proceedings regarding the district court's jurisdiction to consider the
petition.

(R., pp. 107-19.)

If Haas had any issues that were not raised, or

inadequately raised, by counsel in his second petition, he was on notice of such
deficiencies as of that date.

Haas does not contend otherwise. Nonetheless,

Haas did not file his third petition for post-conviction relief until 15 months later,
on July 18, 2012. (R., p. 4.)
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in light of Charboneau and Schwartz, Haas' delay of 15 months before
filing his third petition is unreasonable. Haas has provided no reason why he did
not file his third petition, or adequately assert the third petition's claims earlier.
Accordingly, Haas has failed to show his petition was timely.

This Court must

therefore affirm the district court's order summarily dismissing Haas' petition.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order dismissing Haas' third petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2013.

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of October, 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

James T. Haas #37962
ICC QLIB
PO Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707
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